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Abstract
A contingent valuation survey of forest landowners in Southern Vermont and Western
Massachusetts suggests that it would cost about $700 per acre to entice about one-half of
Massachusetts and 33% of Vermont respondents to permanently conserve their forestland.
Policies that promote early development of management plans and cooperation with
neighbors are recommended because these activities appear to increase the likelihood that
landowners will convey conservation easements. Education and a strong environmental ethic
also improve the chances that respondents would sell conservation easements. A predictionbased contingent valuation format designed to reduce incentives for strategic behavior
suggests that our results likely represent a lower bound estimate of landowner response to a
large-scale conservation easement program.
r 2009 Elsevier GmbH. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
Management and preservation of forested landscapes is critical to protect essential
ecosystem services such as water quality and wildlife habitat. However, most nonindustrial private forestland owners do not participate in existing state or federal
management programs. For example, only about 13% of qualiﬁed forestland in
Massachusetts is enrolled in the Chapter 61 program which provides a 95% property
tax reduction in return for preparation of a forest management plan. Only 8% of
eligible forestland is enrolled in the Massachusetts Stewardship Program funded by
the USDA Forest Service, and surveys conducted by Klosowski et al. (2001) and
Stevens et al. (2002) suggest that landowner participation in a wide variety of
management programs with varying levels of economic incentive is likely to range
from only about 2% to 18%.
Forestland fragmentation and conversion to development is another factor
affecting provision of ecosystem services by forestland. Much of the forest in the
United States (i.e., 42%; Butler and Leatherberry, 2004) is owned by private families
and individuals. This type of ownership is even more common in the eastern states
(e.g., Massachusetts 78%, Vermont 65%, New York 61%; Birch, 1996; FIA, 2002).
As private land is sold and divided or converted, ownership size decreases; it is
estimated that average parcel size in the United States will decline from a 1996
average of 10 to 7 ha by 2010 (Sampson and DeCoster, 2000). And forest loss can be
as high as 18 ha/day in densely populated states like Massachusetts (Steel, 1999;
MacConnell et al., 1991; Alerich, 2000).
New programs to protect forests and to foster forestland management are needed.
Among the alternatives, increased use of conservation easements has often been
suggested (Cho et al., 2005). However, easements may be expensive to obtain, and
although some information about the public’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for
easements has been published, very few studies have focused on the willingness of
landowners to sell, WTS, conservation easements.
Information about WTS is important, in part, because this often determines the
amount of land that can be preserved. And, understanding the relationship between
landowner’s socio-demographic characteristics, land ownership objectives and
willingness to sell is critical for the design of efﬁcient easement purchase programs.
In this study, we focus on forestland owner’s willingness-to-sell conservation
easements in southern New England, and on key characteristics of potential sellers.
We begin with a brief overview of the concept of conservation easements and
previous literature on the WTP for, and willingness-to-sell easements.

Background
As noted by Cho et al. (2005), conservation easements are ‘‘a legal arrangement
between a landowner and a land trust or government agency that permanently limits
development of land’’. The use of easements to protect land from development has

been increasing dramatically. Between 2000 and 2005, the amount of land under
easement in the United States doubled to 6.2 million acres, and the number of land
trusts increased by 32% to 1667 (Aldrich and Wyerman, 2006). During this same
period, the amount of land under easement in the northeast increased by 1,547,089
acres (203%) (Aldrich and Wyerman, 2006). In Massachusetts, 161 land trusts
collectively own 118,240 acres, hold easements on 61,569 acres, and have been
involved in the conservation or reconveyance of protected land (e.g., passing
easements on to state agencies) on 104,518 acres, for a total inﬂuence of 284,327
acres (Aldrich and Wyerman, 2006). In Vermont, 35 land trusts own 69,204 acres,
hold easements on 399,681 acres, and have reconveyed 107,848 acres, for a total
conservation impact of 576,733 acres (Aldrich and Wyerman, 2006). Land trusts,
though often small and poorly funded, can be very effective catalysts for land
protection, since they can act quickly, unencumbered by state and federal
bureaucracies, and have strong local support. The recent expansion of the land
trust ‘‘movement’’ nationally is a testimony to the important role they can play in the
conservation of open space. However, the future role of easements depends, at least
in part, on the public’s WTP and landowner’s willingness-to-sell easements.
Although several studies have estimated the public’s WTP to preserve open space
and agricultural land, we are aware of only one recent study of WTP for easements
to preserve forestland in the United States (Cho et al., 2005). Results suggest that in
Mason County, Georgia, WTP per household per year ranges between $10.97 and
$21.79; an amount that could reduce forestland conversion in that region by
14–46%.
Very little evidence of landowners’ willingness-to-sell conservation easements has
been published. Dedrick et al. (2000) conducted a survey of non-industrial private
forestland owners in Virginia to determine their attitudes toward the Nature
Conservancy Forest Bank Program. In this program, the Conservancy buys timber
rights from landowners in areas of ecological importance and then manages the
timber in an ecologically sound manner. Dedrick et al. found that only 8% of
respondents would enroll in such a program immediately and 15% expressed interest
in participation in the future. However, 77% said they would not participate in this
program.
Stevens et al. (2002) gathered information about private landowners’ likely
reaction to several alternative forest management programs, some of which required
conveyance of timber rights in exchange for an annual payment. Likely participation
rates ranged from only 2% to about 21% depending on the payment amount and
other program requirements such as obligation to provide public access. Unlike the
United States, private forestland in many European and Scandinavian countries is
heavily inﬂuenced by zoning that prohibits or strongly discourages land use
conversion to developed use (e.g., Grayson, 1993). There are examples, however, of
forest policies designed to inﬂuence private woodland owner behavior and to
promote conservation goals above and beyond discouraging or prohibiting overall
land use conversion. In Finland, for example, METSO is a new program designed to
enhance conservation values on private land that contribute to greater biodiversity
regionally and nationally (METSO, 2008). Horne (2006) studied the likelihood that

private forest owners in Finland would enroll in variations of a voluntary
conservation enhancement program based on the initiator of the contract, varying
levels of restriction on forest use, annual compensation, duration of the agreements,
and the ability to withdraw from the program. Likelihood of adopting a voluntary
conservation program on private property was signiﬁcantly increased if the
landowners themselves initiated arrangement (as opposed to an environmental
organization, which had a signiﬁcant negative effect on adoption of the program).
Landowners were more likely to participate if the contract duration was relatively
short (e.g., 5–10 years), the present owner was allowed to cancel the contract, and
restrictions on use involved small preserved patches of natural attributes or
development of a nature management plan. Likelihood of adoption signiﬁcantly
decreased if no harvesting was permitted. Participation in the program increased
with the level of compensation, with the average demand for annual compensation
being approximately $143 per acre. Overall, these landowners are apparently
reluctant to cede much control over their land without meaningful levels of
compensation.
A more recent study by Siikamaki and Layton (2007) examined the potential
effectiveness of incentive payment programs for biological conservation of nonindustrial private forestland in Finland. Their survey of 2400 forestland owners
suggested that incentive payment programs are likely to be more cost effective than
top-down conservation regulations. Similar results have been reported in studies of
conservation payment programs in Costa Rica, Mexico, Ecuador, and portions of
Columbia (see http://www.oas.org/dsd/pes/programs.htm).
Taken together, these studies suggest that interest in programs paying owners for
conservation of forestland is increasing.

Methods
A mail survey of 1,700 forestland owners in Southern Vermont and 1,200 owners
in Western Massachusetts (owning 10 or more acres) contained a closed-ended
contingent valuation (CV) question asking about willingness to sell a conservation
easement for a speciﬁed amount of money per acre. Terms of the easement (see
Appendix A) were the same for all survey recipients. Because prior research
suggested that public access is a very controversial aspect of easements, the scenario
explicitly stated that public access would not need to be granted.
The proposed ‘‘sales’’ price, which was randomly distributed to recipients, ranged
from $100 to $700 per acre. This range was chosen because it is believed to be a
realistic representation of the market value of forestland, with no development
potential, in the region.
As noted by Murphy et al. (2005), a potential problem with the CV method is that
respondents may often behave strategically. In their meta analysis, Murphy et al.
(2005) found that WTP valuations are often overstated when compared to real
payments. Although there is less information about this ‘‘hypothetical bias’’ in

willingness-to-sell studies, List and Gallet (2001) report that hypothetical bias
associated with willingness to sell may often exceed that observed in the more
common WTP format.
Although several alternative methods have been employed to correct for the
potential problem of hypothetical bias, none appear to work well in all
circumstances. In this study, we used a split sample approach; one-half of the
Vermont landowners received a ‘‘prediction’’ form of the CV valuation question.
This approach (see Appendix A) is based on the notion that when asked to predict
the behavior of others, the locus of control is shifted away from the respondent
resulting in less strategic behavior and hypothetical bias. In fact, Lusk and Norwood
(2005) report that the prediction approach yields CV results that are very close to
actual behavior.
Principle components analysis (PCA) was used to consolidate several highly
correlated survey variables into fewer, uncorrelated dimensions. This technique was
applied separately to three multiple part survey questions. The ﬁrst was an eight part
question asking respondents how recently they had considered various decisions
about their land including potential sale, timber sale, and development of a
management plan. The next was a six part question asking about ownership
objectives, and the last was a 15 part question about attitudes towards land
ownership and the environment in general. The principle components approach was
used for two reasons. First, deriving several principle components from many
correlated variables facilitates interpretation. For example, we can discuss a
landowner’s (or group of landowners’) relative views on RECREATION (deﬁned
in Table 1) as a whole, as opposed to discussing responses to several different, but
related speciﬁc questions about recreation. Second, PCA forms orthogonal,
uncorrelated dimensions that can be used in subsequent regression analyses. These
new variables are often an improvement over the original, correlated variables.
However, it is important to note that principal components analysis assumes
linearity and it is impossible to test for whether the selected components are
statistically signiﬁcant representations of the underlying data. Consequently, PCA
should generally be considered an exploratory technique. The components derived in
this study from survey responses are reported in Table 1.
The following logit regression models were then estimated:
WTS ¼ f ðacre; education; family; use; environment; recreation; must pay,
management; land sale; cooperation; state; Ln offer; absenteeÞ (1)
The dependent variable, WTS, equals 1 if the respondent would be willing to sell an
easement and 0 otherwise. Acre is size of land holding, education is highest level
attained, state ¼ 1 if Massachusetts and 0 if Vermont, and Ln offer is the natural log
of dollars per acre. There are several large ski areas and all season resorts in part of
the region examined in this study. As a result, about 26% of Massachusetts and 43%
of Vermont respondents were classiﬁed as absentee. Since we hypothesize that
absentee owners might respond differently to an easement program relative to
residents, a dummy variable which equals 1 for an absentee owner was also included.

Table 1. Principle components.
Factor

Description

Management Considered development of management plan or timber sale. (High values
indicate never or long time ago, low values indicate recently.)a
Cooperation Ever contacted neighbor or neighbor contacted you about cooperative
management. (High values ¼ never or long ago; low values ¼ recently.)a
Land sale
Ever considered a land sale. (High values indicate never or long time ago; low
values ¼ recently.)a
Responsibility Landowner feels responsibility for maintaining social and ecological beneﬁts
from forestland. (High scores ¼ greater responsibility.)
Must pay
Owner feels that land must pay for itself. (High scores ¼ strong feelings that
land must pay.)
Recreation
Importance of land for recreation, scenery or privacy. (High score ¼ more
important.)
Environment Importance of protecting environment and protecting land from development.
(High score ¼ more important.)
Use
Importance of income from timber, ﬁrewood, maple syrup. (High
score ¼ more important.)
Family
Importance of passing on land to children. (High score ¼ more important.)
a

1 ¼ within the last 6 months; 2 ¼ last year; 5 ¼ within 5 years; 6 ¼ never.

All other variables are deﬁned in Table 1:
WTSP ¼ f ðsame independent variables as model 1 except for stateÞ

(2)

In model 2, WTSP equals 1 if a respondent predicted that a neighbor would grant
a conservation easement and 0 otherwise. Data for this model was obtained from
Vermont respondents only.

Results
The survey response rates were 44% and 46% for Vermont and Massachusetts,
respectively. A short telephone survey of randomly selected non-respondents was
used to test for non-response bias. Although similar in most respects, respondents
were more likely to be enrolled in forest management programs and owned larger
parcels compared to non-respondents. Consequently, our analysis focuses on survey
respondents; the results should not be extrapolated to all forestland owners within
the region.
About 56% of Vermont respondents live on their forestland. The average parcel
owned by Vermont respondents was 63 acres (25.5 ha), three-quarters of respondents
were older than 51 and 72% had completed college. Almost three-quarters had never
considered granting a conservation easement and 47% had never thought about

development of a management plan for their forest (see Table 2). A larger percentage
of Massachusetts respondents live on their land (74%), average parcel size was about
the same as for Vermont, and 59% have a college degree. Sixty-three percent of
Massachusetts respondents had never considered a conservation easement and 43%
had never considered development of a management plan.
Also, as shown in Table 2, most respondents in both states have never contacted a
neighbor about forest management issues. Most (67% Massachusetts and 70%
Vermont) agreed or strongly agreed with the notion that their forestland beneﬁts
society as a whole. A majority said that recreation was an important or very
important reason for land ownership and only a small percentage of respondents
cited income from timber as an important reason to own forestland.
Table 3 shows the distribution of WTS responses by offer amount. If ‘‘don’t know
or maybe’’ responses are ignored, 47% of respondents said they would be WTS an
easement for $700 per acre while 53% would not. As expected, the percentage of
respondents WTS appeared to increase with the amount offered.
Table 2. Results of selected survey question (MA and VT).
Question

Results
MA VT

5.2 and 4.9 for MA and VT respectively
Never considered sale of land (%)
Never considered timber sale (%)
Never considered management plan (%)
Never contacted neighbor about land management issue (%)
Agree or strongly agree that ‘‘land must pay way’’ (%)
Agree or strongly agree that their land beneﬁts society (%)
Recreation on owners land is an important or very important reason for
ownership (%)
Income from timber is a very important or important reason to own land (%)
Passing land to children is important or very important reason for ownership (%)

5.24
58.4
30.5
42.5
69.7
29.8
66.7
58.8

4.93
63.6
32.6
46.8
66.9
22.4
70.1
64.5

8.7 7.8
54.3 63.3

Table 3. Distribution of WTS by offer amount (percent)a.
Response

Offer ($ per acre)
$100

$300

$500

$700

Yes (%)
No (%)

37
63

37
63

42
58

47
53

Total (%)

100

100

100

100

a
Only Yes or No answers were included. A total of 11% of respondents gave a Don’t Know or Maybe
response.

Table 4. WTS model parameter estimates.
Parameter

Estimate

Standard error

Wald w2

Pr4w2

INTERCEPT
Ln OFFER
ACRE
EDUCATION
FAMILY
USE
ENVIRONMENT
RECREATION
MUST PAY WAY
MANAGEMENT
LAND SALE
COOPERATION
ABSENTEE
STATE

3.4685***
0.2608*
0.00172
0.2566***
0.038
0.1402
0.6143***
0.2173*
0.2157*
0.1811*
0.1103
0.2603***
0.4145*
0.7551***

0.9247
0.1371
0.00125
0.0949
0.0969
0.1064
0.1081
0.1136
0.1121
0.1035
0.1002
0.0946
0.234
0.2063

14.0678
3.6159
1.8878
7.3145
0.1573
1.734
32.2991
3.6621
3.7031
3.0623
1.2116
7.5688
3.1378
13.4027

0.0002
0.0572
0.1694
0.0068
0.6951
0.1879
o0.0001
0.0557
0.0543
0.0801
0.271
0.0059
0.0765
0.0003

***Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Likelihood ratio 93.27 (o0.0001).

The logit models were then used to investigate the socio/economic factors
associated with WTS. Results derived from the two logit models are presented in
Tables 4 and 5.1
Statistically signiﬁcant variables in Table 4 include Ln offer, education,
environment, recreation, must pay way, management, cooperation, absentee, and
state. As expected, the likelihood that a landowner would convey an easement
increases with the amount of compensation offered (Ln OFFER). And, the more
education a landowner has, the more likely he or she will convey an easement.2
Those who feel ‘‘land must pay its way’’ were signiﬁcantly less likely to be WTS. The
USE variable was insigniﬁcant in this model, suggesting income from land is
relatively unimportant in the context of conservation easements. However, the more
importance a landowner places on protecting the environment and on recreation, the
more likely he or she will convey an easement.
The variable MANAGEMENT is signiﬁcant and negative. Lower scores on this
factor mean that the owner has considered development of a management plan or
sale of timber recently. The negative sign suggests that the more recently one of these
decisions has been considered, the more likely a landowner will convey a
1

These are log-linear models; the natural log of OFFER was used to insure that WTS cannot be
negative.
2
We did not speciﬁcally ask about household income since it is often not provided by respondents.
However, education is often correlated with income.

Table 5. WTSP-prediction model parameter estimates.
Parameter

Estimate

Standard error

Wald w2

Pr4w2

INTERCEPT
Ln OFFER
ACRE
EDUCATION
FAMILY
USE
ENVIRONMENT
RECREATION
MUST PAY WAY
MANAGEMENT
LAND SALE
COOPERATION
ABSENTEE

4.9102**
0.5588**
0.00258
0.424**
0.1171
0.1916
0.1093
0.1634
0.0469
0.2162
0.0347
0.2842
1.3053***

2.0084
0.2817
0.00316
0.2152
0.2363
0.2597
0.2219
0.2218
0.2132
0.2165
0.2405
0.1908
0.4389

5.9769
3.9345
0.668
3.8805
0.2457
0.5442
0.2428
2.5424
0.0485
0.9968
0.0208
2.2184
8.844

0.0145
0.0473
0.4137
0.0489
0.6201
0.4607
0.6222
0.4615
0.8257
0.3181
0.8854
0.1364
0.0029

*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Likelihood Ratio ¼ 27.6879*** (0.0061).

conservation easement. Conversely, landowners who have never considered a
management plan (or have not considered one in some time) will be less likely to
convey an easement, holding other variables constant.
Interpretation of the COOPERATION variable is similar to the MANAGEMENT component: landowners who have recently considered cooperation with
other landowners, or have been recently contacted by a neighbor, are more likely to
convey an easement. The variables for STATE and ABSENTEE are signiﬁcant and
positive, indicating that Massachusetts respondents and absentee owners are more
likely to convey a conservation easement.
The second model (WTS prediction, Table 5) was estimated for respondents who
received the prediction-based WTS question (i.e., ‘‘Do you think any of your
adjacent neighboring landowners would be willing to sell a conservation
easement?’’). One hundred and eighty-three respondents (all in Vermont) received
the WTS prediction question and answered either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Of these, 148
provided usable responses to all independent variables.
As shown in Table 5, Ln OFFER is positive and signiﬁcant in the prediction
model. The more education a respondent has, the more likely he or she will predict
that a neighbor will convey an easement. And, it is important to note that absentee
owners are less likely to predict that a neighbor will be WTS a conservation
easement.
In addition to providing information about the factors associated with WTS, logit
models of the type estimated here are often used to derive point estimates of median
and mean WTS. However, in referendum CV, median and mean value estimates are

often very sensitive to the logit model speciﬁcation (Hanemann, 1984, 1989; Haab
and McConnell, 1998; Vaughn et al., 1999). Vaughn et al., for example, report
several central tendency estimates (derived from a single data set) that differ by a
factor of 4. The logit models used in our study (see Tables 4 and 5) were speciﬁed in
log-linear form to insure that WTS cannot be negative. However, as noted by Haab
and McConnell (1998), models which are truncated at zero tend to have fat tails and
since WTS can range from 0 to inﬁnity, exceedingly high means and medians often
result. Various ways of setting an upper bound on WTS have been used, but any
upper constraint on WTS is likely to be somewhat arbitrary.
Consequently, we do not focus on median or mean estimates of WTS. Rather, we
examine the likelihood of easement program enrollment when landowners are
offered the approximate average upper bound market price of undeveloped land in
the study area ($700 per acre). WTS probability estimates derived from the logit
models are reported in Table 6. All probabilities were calculated at the means of the
independent variables and with an offer price of $700 per acre.
Comparing the results in Tables 3 and 6, the logit model (pooled data) predicts a
slightly lower probability of participation associated with a $700 per acre offer (47%
from Table 3 and 43% from Table 6, pooled model). Since the logit model ﬁt is not
perfect, this difference should not be surprising.
Of particular interest is that when compared to Vermont, Massachusetts
respondents appear to be much more likely to sell conservation easements (Table
6; likelihood of sale given a $700 offer equals 33% in Vermont and 51% in
Massachusetts).
One reason for this ﬁnding may be differences in anticipated land values between
the two states. Because of vacation opportunities, second home development, and
skiing, forestland in the Vermont study area has the potential to be more valuable
than similar land in the Massachusetts region. Another factor may be differences
between these states in the ‘‘culture’’ surrounding land protection. In general, sale of
conservation easements has been more common in the portion of Massachusetts
examined in this study. For example, the state of Massachusetts recently spent about
$9 million to protect land close to the region studied here. In Vermont, the emphasis
has been more on easement donations as opposed to purchase. Consequently,

Table 6. Probability of WTS at offer price of $700 per acre.
Group

Probability (%)

Pooled
Vermont
Massachusetts
Absentee
Resident
Predictiona

43
33
51
50
40
47

a

Prediction estimates refer to Vermont only.

Massachusetts landowners may have a much different expectation about easement
purchase as compared to those in Vermont.
The results in Table 6 suggest a difference between individual behavior and the
predicted behavior of others with respect to sale of conservation easements (47%
prediction model vs. 33% Vermont self-estimates).3 This may mean that survey
respondents underestimated the likelihood that they would be WTS at the $700
price, as might be expected if hypothetical bias is present. However, further research
about this issue is needed.
It is also important to note that with respect to individual WTS, landowners who
have more education, are more concerned about environmental protection and
recreation and have recently cooperated with neighbors are much more likely to be
WTS a conservation easement (see Table 4). Also, absentee owners were much
more likely to convey a conservation easement; the likelihood of sale at the $700
price was 50% for absentee and 40% for residents (see Table 6). However, the
prediction model suggests that absentee owners predict that neighbors will be less
likely to sell.
It is not clear why residents and absentee owners differ. Analysis of survey
responses show that residents are more concerned about non-market values
associated with their land. Absentee owners felt more strongly that ‘‘land must
pay its way’’. However, residents were not statistically different from absentee
owners with respect to age, education, duration of ownership or acres owned. Yet,
compared to residents, absentees are more likely to convey a conservation easement
but less likely to predict that a neighbor would grant an easement. More research
about the differences between these two groups is clearly needed.
From a policy perspective, it is important to examine the relative inﬂuence of the
statistically signiﬁcant logit model variables on WTS conservation easements.
Traditional odds ratio estimates associated with the logit models estimated here
are somewhat difﬁcult to interpret because many of our variables are categorical;
implying, for example, that an increase in education from level 1 to 2 has the
same impact as an increase from level 2 to 3.4 With this caveat in mind, we focus
only on the variables that are statistically signiﬁcant and for which public policy
can potentially control. Among these are management and cooperation.
Although, as noted above, odds ratios associated with each of these variables must
be interpreted with caution, a one unit increase in the management variable implies a
18% decrease in the probability of conveying an easement. That is, a one unit delay
in the consideration of management plan development (Table 4) results in an 18%
decrease in the odds that the average landowner will be WTS an easement. And, a
one unit delay in ‘‘cooperation’’ (see Table 4) implies a 22% decrease in the
likelihood of selling an easement.
Consequently, public programs that encourage landowners to consider development of a management plan and cooperation with neighbors sooner, rather than
3

The prediction model applies to Vermont respondents only.
An alternative logit model speciﬁcation employing n1 dummy variables avoids this problem, but is
not feasible given the number of categorical variables used in this study.
4

later, might have a large and statistically signiﬁcant impact on the sale of
conservation easements. Programs that have encouraged management plan
development have traditionally relied on cost-sharing incentives or subsidies, in
terms of $ per acre or $ per plan and have appealed to a relatively small segment of
the overall landowner population. Programs to foster cooperation between
neighbors are much fewer in number, and have largely been untested (e.g., Campbell
and Kittredge, 1996), but recent results suggest that certain segments of the
landowner population would be interested in explicit cooperation with neighbors for
various reasons (e.g., land protection, habitat improvement, recreation, shared
management expenses or timber harvesting; see Finley et al., 2006).
These ﬁndings can also be used to (1) help conservation organizations to costeffectively target outreach campaigns to forestland owners amenable to conservation
programs and (2) to tailor education campaigns to concentrate on changing attitudes
about cooperation and development of management plans.
Finally, there are an estimated 585,054 and 378,601 forested acres in the Western
Massachusetts and Southern Vermont areas surveyed in this study. Assuming an
offer price of $700 per acre and that all landowners are ‘‘average’’, 423,316 acres of
forestland could be protected at a cost of about $296 million.5 At ﬁrst glance, this
might seem like an extraordinary sum for public investment, but when one considers
the potential public beneﬁts from land protected, it seems much less daunting.
Investment in public infrastructure to yield social beneﬁts on this scale is not without
precedent. Metro Boston’s non-ﬁltered surface water supply is protected by the
100,000-acre forested Quabbin Reservation. To provide equivalent ﬁltration, $500
million would be needed just to build the facility. Massachusetts built the Quabbin
Reservoir and tunnels in the 1930s at a cost of $53 million, which in today’s dollars is
the equivalent of $599.5 million. Massachusetts residents made similar infrastructural investments in transportation in 1957 when $257 million was spent to construct
123 miles of Massachusetts Turnpike (the equivalent today of $1.7 billion). In the
1990s, Massachusetts spent over $14 billion for the Central Artery/Tunnel
Project (known locally as the Big Dig) to facilitate trafﬁc ﬂow through Boston. It
is also interesting to note that a tax on gasoline in Massachusetts of $0.01 per gallon
(i.e., raising the current state and federal tax on gasoline from $0.39 per gallon to
$0.40 per gallon) would return $27 million annually. And, there is a justiﬁable
symmetry of taxing cars and trucks to pay for protected forestland that will
perpetually sequester the carbon emitted on a daily basis. While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to present tested policy solutions to the loss of forest and the
emanating public beneﬁts, our results do suggest important WTS information that
can assist in the formation of policy alternatives for further study, experimentation,
or consideration.

5

This calculation is based on the probability estimates given in Table 6. At a $700 per acre price, 33% of
Vermont respondents and 51% of Massachusetts respondents would be WTS easements. Assuming that
33% of Vermont forestland and 51% of Massachusetts forestland is owned by these groups, the total
acreage preserved would be about 423 thousand acres.

Conclusions
In the context of public policy, the conservation of forestland is partly a ﬁnancial
question – How much would it cost to protect from development a signiﬁcant
amount of forestland? Our results indicate that it would cost about $700 per acre to
entice about one-half of Massachusetts and 33% of Vermont landowners surveyed in
this study to permanently conserve their forestland. In other words, Massachusetts
owners (and absentee owners) would be willing to permanently protect their land at
a lower cost. And as noted above, about 423,000 acres of forestland could be
protected at a cost of about $296 million.
The likelihood that a landowner would convey an easement is greater for those
who have recently undertaken cooperative activities with other landowners. As
expected, a strong environment ethic improves the chances that a landowner would
be amenable to selling an easement. Perhaps the biggest potential for development of
a successful easement program would be an outreach program to encourage
landowners to develop management plans and to cooperate with neighbors as soon
as possible. Management plan subsidies and incentives have been available for
decades and appealed to some. But, linking them more strongly to land protection
and easements, and making a concerted effort to foster cooperation may result in
more easements on private land.
Finally, prediction theory was utilized in our WTS analysis to account for
potential strategic bias, our assumption being that respondents would be more
accurate in their prediction of other landowner’s behavior than their prediction of
their own. Prediction and individual WTS results were different; and at a $700 per
acre price, more than about 423 thousand acres might actually be conserved.
Consequently, the results reported here may be viewed as a lower bound estimate of
what might be achieved with a large-scale conservation easement program.

Appendix A
This next question asks about conservation easements. Please understand that we
are only interested in your opinion on this issue. You are NOT being asked to join
such a program. You will NOT be contacted by anyone regardless of your answer.
A conservation easement is a binding agreement that permanently limits uses of all
or a portion of one’s land in order to protect its conservation values. It would allow a
landowner to continue to own and use the land and sell it or pass it on to heirs. But it
would limit some of the rights associated with the land. For example, a conservation
easement may stipulate that a landowner cannot sell the land for housing or
development. Because the easement would extinguish the right to develop, it could
result in a reduction in assessed value and property taxes.
Easements can vary greatly in their detail and level of restriction. They are
voluntary arrangements between a landowner and an organization that holds the
easement. The same way a right-of-way can be deeded from one landowner to

another, so can the development rights be deeded from one landowner to another
organization through an easement.
Below, we present one possible easement scenario for your consideration. Since
easements, their restrictions, and values can vary based on the agreement between a
willing landowner and a conservation organization, there is not one universal
approach. We describe one possible easement scenario below, and ask whether you
think you would be willing to sell a conservation easement based on these features:








90% of your property would be protected from development by a conservation
easement, with the remainder left out providing for up to 3 potential building lots
in the future.
On the 90% of the property with the easement, development would be restricted.
That is, no structures could be built on this part of the land. Personal recreation,
hunting, and timber harvest would still be allowed.
The easement would be permanent. If the land was sold, the easement would
remain in effect. The remaining 10% of the land with the three potential building
lots could be managed, developed, or sold without restriction.
In return for this easement, you and the surrounding community could be certain
that this land would never be developed and would always remain forestland.
You would not need to grant public access to the land which is protected by the
easement.
You would be paid $100/$300/$500/$700 per acre for the easement.

Question for WTS model
Would you be willing to sell a conservation easement according to the scenario
above?
& Yes
& No. If no, why not? __________________________________________

Question for prediction model
Do you think any of your adjacent neighboring landowners would be willing to
sell a conservation easement according to the scenario above?
& Yes
& No. If no, why not? __________________________________________
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